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In re ATM Fee Litigation: Ninth Circuit Uses Illinois Brick
to Build a High Wall For Indirect Purchasers
Meagan P. VanderWeele*
I. INTRODUCTION
Price fixing and other antitrust violations most frequently injure in-
direct purchasers', those who purchase goods through retailers and
other intermediaries rather than directly from the antitrust violator.2
The direct purchasers, typically retailers and other middlemen, gener-
ally escape injury by passing on any overcharges to their purchasers,
who in turn pass on the costs to consumers and other ultimate pur-
chasers.3 Thus, consumers and indirect purchasers are the true victims
of passed-on overcharges because they are the ones who ultimately
pay an artificially inflated price.4 One of the central objectives of anti-
trust laws in the United States is to promote consumer welfare. How-
ever, under the indirect purchaser rule set forth in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois5, the real victims of price-fixing are unable to obtain relief.6
Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants a right to sue for treble damages
to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, May 2014; B.A. Sociology and Political
Science, Women's Studies minor, University of Michigan, May 2011. The Author would like to
thank the editors of the DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal for their help in editing
and preparing this Note for publication.
1. "An 'indirect purchaser' is a buyer who is more than one step removed from the antitrust
violator in the chain of distribution." Cynthia Urda Kassis, Comment, The Indirect Purchaser's
Right to Sue Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Another Congressional Response to Illinois
Brick, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1087, 1087 n.1 (1983) (citation omitted). "Individual consumers, small
businesses, and governmental bodies are usually indirect purchasers." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 96-
239, at 2 (1979)).
2. Id. at 1087.
3. "'Pass-on' is a process by which an entity in a chain of distribution adjusts its price upward
to compensate for an overcharge by a prior party in the chain . . . . [slellers normally pass on
costs downward in the chain of distribution from the manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser."
Id. at 1087 n.2 (citing Note, Antitrust Law-In re Beef Antitrust Litigation: A Crack Appears in
the Illinois Brick Wall, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 185, 186 n.6 (1981); Jerry L. Beane, Passing-on Re-
vived: An Antitrust Dilemma, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 347, 349 (1980)).
4. George J. Benston, Indirect Purchasers' Standing To Claim Damages in Price Fixing Anti-
trust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick Rule, 55 Arn-
TRUST L.J. 213, 217 (1986).
5. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
6. See Kassis, supra note 1, at 1087.
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reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."7 By providing a
private right of action for those injured by antitrust violations, section
4 is critical in order for injured consumers to recover from any passed-
on costs. 8 However, under the Illinois Brick rule, the Supreme Court
has limited private treble-damage actions to antitrust violators' direct
customers, leaving subsequent purchasers, who often suffer substan-
tial harm from these overcharges, without a remedy. 9
The Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in In re A TM Fee Litigation fur-
ther narrows the scope of section 4 standing by failing to extend criti-
cal exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule and by refusing to recognize an
exception that the Ninth Circuit had previously stated.' 0 While the
court provided important clarifications regarding the scope of two ex-
ceptions to the general rule set forth in Illinois Brick, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in In re ATM Fee Litigation narrowly interpreted the
exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule and held that the plaintiffs, who
did not directly purchase the allegedly price-fixed product from the
defendants, lacked standing to pursue their antitrust claims." There-
fore, because of the Ninth Circuit's restricted application of Illinois
Brick in In re A TM Fee Litigation, it has built a high wall for indirect
purchaser suits. As a result, it will likely be impossible for indirect
purchasers to bring antitrust claims under section 4 of the Clayton
Act, which is inconsistent with section 4's requirement that private
plaintiffs receive treble damages for injuries they have sustained as a
result of an antitrust violation.
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit's opinion in In re A TM Fee
Litigation is problematic for two reasons. First, the court's opinion is
inconsistent with the damage action provision of antitrust law, which
encourages private antitrust litigation and entitles a person injured by
an antitrust violation to treble damages. 12 By severely narrowing the
scope of section 4 standing for indirect purchasers, the court recog-
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
8. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977). In Brunswick,
the Supreme Court noted that Senate discussions concerning the predecessor of section 4 of the
Clayton Act-section 7 of the Sherman Act-"indicate that it was conceived of primarily as a
remedy for '[t]he people of the United States as individuals,' especially consumers." Id. (quoting
21 CONG. REC. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George)). The Court also noted that House
debates concerning section 4 of the Clayton Act confirm that the remedy was "conceived prima-
rily as [a means to open] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured" by
antitrust violations. Id. (quoting 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb)).
9. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 720.
10. See generally Crayton v. Concord EFS, Inc. (In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig.), 686 F.3d 741
(9th Cir. 2012).
11. Id.
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
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nizes standing for the direct purchaser, who has suffered little or no
injury, while denying standing to the injured, indirect purchaser,
which contradicts section 4's mandate that a person injured by an anti-
trust violation is entitled to treble damages.13 Second, by limiting sec-
tion 4 standing to direct purchasers only, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
used Illinois Brick to build a high wall for indirect-purchaser suits,
which is inconsistent with the public policy underlying antitrust law in
general and section 4 of the Clayton Act, in particular.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act
The Clayton Antitrust Act, which Congress enacted to strengthen
federal antitrust laws put in place by the Sherman Act, prohibits an-
ticompetitive price discrimination and exclusive dealing practices.14
The United States has a strong public policy of protecting competi-
tiveness in markets and has implemented that policy through the en-
forcement of a series of antitrust laws.15 These antitrust laws, which
proscribe cartel and monopolizing behavior, reflect the economic ob-jective of enhancing consumer welfare by preventing practices that re-
duce competition.16 The Clayton Act, in particular, focuses on
anticompetitive conduct and prohibits conduct that substantially les-
sens competition or that tends to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.17
Most significantly, the passage of the Clayton Act signaled the ex-
pansion of individual private parties' ability to sue for damages. Spe-
cifically, section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person who is
injured by an antitrust violation "shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonably attor-
ney's fee."18 Thus, section 4 mandates that private parties may re-
cover treble damages for injuries suffered from antitrust violations.
By creating a private right of action for victims of antitrust viola-
tions, Congress was able to promote several polices. Section 4's treble
damages provision provides ample relief and compensation to those
13. See id.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
15. The three major antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal
Trade Commission Act. See, e.g., JoHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST
LAWs: A PRIMER 1, 15-23 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 4th ed.
2001).
16. Id. at 10-11.
17. Id. at 21.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
2013]1 123
124 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:121
injured by anticompetitive conduct, which in turn deters future anti-
trust violations.19 Furthermore, section 4 reflects Congress's intent to
make the Clayton Act self-enforcing by encouraging private litigation
through a treble damages incentive. 20 The treble damages provision
provides strong encouragement for private attorneys to enforce anti-
trust laws, which in turn deters potential violators from violating anti-
trust laws.21 Additionally, the enforcement and deterrence objectives
underlying section 4 further the broad substantive goals of antitrust
law generally: "to promote competition, economic efficiency, and con-
sumer welfare; to prevent concentrations of economic and social
power; and to protect small business from overreaching
conglomerates." 22
Despite the benefits of section 4, courts have approached section 4
claims with caution for fear that the treble damages remedy will result
in an over-deterrence of competition and will burden the courts with a
flood of frivolous suits and speculative claims.23 Thus, courts have de-
veloped specialized standing rules for section 4 plaintiffs, including the
indirect-purchaser rule established in Illinois Brick. However, by cre-
ating restrictive standing rules, victims of anticompetitive behavior are
unable to find relief.
B. The Supreme Court & Section 4: Narrowing the Scope of
Indirect Purchaser Standing
While both the federal government and the individual states have
the power to enforce antitrust laws, private suits have been the
19. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) ("Congress created the treble-
damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust
violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available
to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.") (empah-
sis in original); see also Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Anti-
trust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 809 n.1, 848-50 (1977).
20. Nicholas K. Fowler, Sherman Act-Action for Treble Damages under Section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act-Inquiry by Reason of Conspiracy of Automobile Manufacturers to Restrain Develop-
ment of Emission-Control Devices-In Re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust
Litigation Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 12 B.C. L. REv. 686, 689
(1971). See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) (per-
mitting treble damage actions encourages enforcement of federal antitrust laws); Mech. Contrac-
tors Bid Depository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817, 821 (10th Cir. 1965) (Congress intended
private treble damage actions to stimulate private initiative and diligence in enforcing antitrust
laws).
21. Clare Deffense, Comment, A Farewell to Arms: The Implementation of a Policy-Based
Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 437, 438 (1984).
22. Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 439-40.
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predominate form of antitrust litigation for the past forty years.24
Thus, section 4 of the Clayton Act is critical for consumers seeking to
recover from injuries sustained as a result of antitrust violations be-
cause section 4 is the statutory mandate that entitles a person injured
by an antitrust violation to treble damages. However, the Supreme
Court has narrowly interpreted section 4, thereby limiting the class of
parties that have standing to recover.
A plaintiff who brings suit under the federal antitrust laws must
demonstrate "antitrust standing," a doctrine that embodies the notion
that a plaintiff may not bring suit unless the alleged injury suffered
was proximately caused by the defendant's anticompetitive conduct.25
Historically, section 4's "by reason of,"2 6 or causation, requirement
has received the most attention in the courts.27 On its face, the statute
appears to require only causation-in-fact in order for a plaintiff to
have standing to sue. Courts initially interpreted section 4 of the
Clayton Act as providing a private right of action to anyone who was
injured as a proximate result of an antitrust violation.28 However, the
Supreme Court ended this trend in 1977 with its opinion in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, in which the Court held that, in order to
recover damages under federal antitrust laws, private plaintiffs must
prove more than that anticompetitive conduct caused their injury.29
Instead, "[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."30 Thus, in deter-
mining whether a plaintiff has antitrust standing, courts use a two-
prong approach: courts first consider whether the plaintiff has suf-
fered an antitrust injury as described in Brunswick and then evaluate
several factors, including the directness or indirectness of the asserted
injury, to determine whether the plaintiff is the proper one to assert a
given claim.31
24. Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Symposium, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEo. L.J. 1001, 1002 (1986).
25. See Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (holding that respon-
dent had no right to sue under RICO because the link was too remote between the stock manip-
ulation alleged and the customers' harm, being purely contingent on the harm suffered by the
broker-dealer).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
27. Deffense, supra note 21, at 441.
28. Peter T. Barbur & Jonathan J. Clarke, Antitrust Standing and The New Economy, The
Nat'l Law Journal (Nov. 28, 2011), available at http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Docu-
ments/Publications/3320222_1.pdf.
29. 429 U.S. 477 (1997).
30. Id. at 489 (empahsis in original).
31. Barbur & Clarke, supra note 28. Other factors that courts must consider under this sec-
ond-prong in determining whether a private plaintiff has antitrust standing include the following:
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The Supreme Court first began chipping away at indirect purchaser
standing in the 1968 decision of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.32 The Court considered whether a defendant in an
antitrust suit could avoid liability by proving that the plaintiff, a direct
purchaser, had passed on to its customers any increased costs caused
by an alleged price-fixing violation.33 The Court concluded that the
use of a pass-on theory of damages as a defense tactic was
impermissible. 34
Nine years later in Illinois Brick, the Court held that indirect pur-
chasers cannot base a claim under section 4 of the Clayton Act on the
theory that the seller had passed on illegal overcharges to them.35 To-
gether, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick establish the indirect pur-
chaser or Illinois Brick rule. Under this rule, only those who have
dealt directly with an antitrust violator have standing to sue under
section 4 of the Clayton Act.
In antitrust litigation, a direct purchaser, for example, is one who
acquires a good directly from the defendant. Alternatively, an indi-
rect purchaser acquires the good from a non-defendant further down
the distribution chain, which may have several levels of indirect pur-
chasers but only one direct purchaser.36 The Court's opinion in Illi-
nois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which was decided during the same term as
Brunswick, limited the scope of the second prong of the antitrust
standing doctrine by recognizing standing for direct purchasers only.37
"the existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate
them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement; the speculativeness of the alleged
injury; and the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and indi-
rect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries." Id.
32. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
33. Id. at 487-88.
34. Id. at 494. The Court based its decision on two reasons. First, the Court found that be-
cause a variety of factors influence a company's pricing policy, it would be onerous to determine
the effect of the antitrust violation on pricing and would make proving damages impossible in
many situations. Id. at 49-93. Second, the Court reasoned that if it did not ban use of the pass-
on defense, consumers would have little incentive to bring a private action because antitrust
violators generally cause minimal damage to any single purchaser. Id. at 494. Thus, the Court
rejected the use of the pass-on doctrine because it would allow antitrust violators to profit from
their illegality and would reduce the deterrent effect of section 4's private treble-damage actions.
Id. at 494.
35. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 747 (1977).
36. Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., Indirect Purchaser Class Action Update: California Supreme Court
Limits Applicability of the "Passing On" Defense, Antitrust News & Notes (Aug. 2010), available
at http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/AntitrustNewsAndNotes_201008.
pdf. "An 'indirect purchaser' is a buyer who is more than one step removed from the antitrust
violator in the chain of distribution." Kassis, supra note 1, at 1087 n.1 (1983) (citing S. REP. No.
96-239, at 2 (1979)). "Individual consumers, small businesses, and governmental bodies are usu-
ally indirect purchasers." Id.
37. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746.
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Thus, as a result of the narrow scope of section 4 standing, consumers,
the ultimate victims of antitrust violations, are finding it increasingly
difficult to recover for injuries resulting from alleged antitrust
violations.
C. A Closer Look at Illinois Brick
1. The Illinois Brick Decision
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the State of Illinois and 700 local
governmental entities brought an antitrust action under section 4 of
the Clayton Act, alleging that petitioners, concrete block manufactur-
ers, engaged in a price-fixing scheme in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.3 8 Concrete block manufacturers sell to masonry con-
tractors, who in turn sell to general contractors, creating a chain of
distribution.39 In this case, the plaintiffs did not directly pay the al-
leged fixed-fee but, rather, alleged that the subcontractors, who were
hired by the contractors that the plaintiffs directly hired, engaged in
price-fixing; therefore, the plaintiffs argued that they were indirect
purchasers.40
First, the Supreme Court held in Illinois Brick that the plaintiffs
could not use a pass-on theory of recovery for alleged antitrust viola-
tions.4 1 Because antitrust violators may not use a pass-on theory of
damages defensively against a direct purchaser, the Court reasoned
that an indirect purchaser may not use a pass-on theory offensively
against an alleged antitrust violator.42 Defensive use of the pass-on
theory posits that an allegedly illegal overcharge or fixed-fee does not
injure a manufacturer because that overcharge or fee is passed on to
the customers who purchase from the manufacturer.43
In Hanover Shoe, the Court rejected as a matter of law the defen-
sive use of the pass-on theory.44 A pass-on theory of recovery is
deemed offensive when the plaintiff attempts to argue that she was
injured by an allegedly illegal overcharge or fixed-fee, even though
the plaintiff indirectly paid the charge or fee, because it was passed-on
to the plaintiff by the direct purchaser.45 The Court's holding in Illi-
nois Brick, that indirect purchasers may not use a pass-on theory to
38. Id. at 726-27.
39. Id. at 726.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 724.
42. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 745-46.
43. Id. at 728-29.
44. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
45. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.
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recover damages, means that indirect purchasers do not have standing
to bring an antitrust price-fixing case under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.46
Second, the Court held that because the plaintiffs did not directly
pay the allegedly fixed fee, they were indirect purchasers and, as such,
did not have standing under section 4 of the Act.47 Consequently, the
Illinois Brick rule prohibits plaintiffs from seeking damages for anti-
trust violations under section 4 of the Clayton Act if the plaintiffs did
not directly pay the alleged fixed fee. 48 Since the Supreme Court's
decision in Illinois Brick, courts have generally refused to allow dam-
age actions under federal antitrust laws by indirect purchasers.49
2. The Resulting Rule and Its Exceptions
There are several reasons supporting the Illinois Brick rule. The
rule eliminates overly complicated efforts to apportion recovery of
overcharges among potential plaintiffs.50 Estimating the amount of
damages passed on to an indirect purchaser is complicated because
tracing fixed-fees or overcharges through several levels of a chain of
distribution would require additional complicated proceedings involv-
ing massive evidence and complicated theories.5' Additionally, the
rule eliminates multiple recoveries. 52 If offensive but not defensive
use of the pass-on theory were allowed, it would create a serious risk
of multiple liabilities for defendants.53 Overlapping recoveries would
result because both the indirect and direct purchaser would be able to
recover.54 Furthermore, the Illinois Brick rule promotes the vigorous
enforcement of antitrust laws.55 The Supreme Court stated that it was
reluctant to carve out exceptions to this rule; however, three impor-
tant exceptions (and a possible fourth) exist.56
a. Cost-Plus Exception
Where a cost-plus contract exists between an indirect and direct
purchaser, courts have held that the indirect purchaser has standing to
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 724.
49. Herbert Hovenkamp, Commentary, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1717, 1717 (1990).
50. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 208 (1990).
51. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 737-44.
52. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 212.
53. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730-31.
54. Id.
55. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 214.
56. Id. at 216 (quoting Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 744).
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seek damages for antitrust violations under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.57 A cost-plus contract is a fixed-markup, fixed-quantity contract
that parties negotiate prior to an illegal price increase.58 The direct
purchaser adds a pre-specified dollar amount to its price for a product
before resale or adds a pre-specified percentage of its cost to the sale
price.59 When a preexisting cost-plus contract exists between the cus-
tomer and direct purchaser, "the purchaser is insulated from any de-
crease in its sales as a result of attempting to pass on the overcharge,
because its customer is committed to buying a fixed quantity regard-
less of price." 60 The overcharge's effect is determined in advance, and
the cost-plus contract circumvents the complex market interaction of
supply and demand "that complicates the [overcharge] determination
in the general case." 61 Furthermore, there is no apportioning problem
and no danger of duplicative recovery because the overcharge is fully
passed on to the indirect purchaser under the terms of the contract.62
Although the Supreme Court recognized a pre-existing cost-plus
contract exception to indirect purchaser suits, the Court's decision in
Kansas v. UtiliCorp United severely limited this exception. 63 In that
case, the indirect purchasers were residents of Kansas and Missouri
who claimed they had purchased natural gas from various utilities at
inflated prices that were fixed by a pipeline and group of gas produc-
tion companies. 64 The direct purchaser was the utility company serv-
ing the indirect purchasers.65 The defendants claimed that the utility
lacked standing because it passed the entire overcharge on to its cus-
tomers.66 However, the Court held that the utility company had
standing while its indirect purchaser customers, despite the existence
of a contract between the utility company and its customers, did not. 6 7
Although the Court recognized the cost-plus exception to the Illi-
nois Brick rule, the Court held that the exception did not apply be-
cause the respondent utility company did not sell the gas, which the
supplier pipeline company allegedly overcharged, to its customers
57. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736; UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 217-18.
58. Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1720.
59. Id.
60. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736.
61. Id.
62. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern
Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 n.115 (1999).
63. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 204 (1990).
64. Id.
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under a preexisting cost-plus contract. 68 Rather, the utility company
passed on its costs to the consumers as required by regulations and
tariffs, which only resembled a cost-plus contract. 69 The Court nar-
rowly construed the cost-plus exception and refused to expand its
scope to apply to instances that resemble that of a cost-plus contract. 70
b. Co-Conspirator Exception
An indirect purchaser may have standing to seek damages for al-
leged antitrust violations under section 4 of the Clayton Act under a
"co-conspirator exception."71 An indirect purchaser may bring suit if
he can establish a price-fixing conspiracy between the manufacturer
and middleman. 72 This exception applies when the direct purchaser
conspires, either horizontally or vertically, to fix the price paid by the
plaintiff bringing a claim under section 4.73 The Ninth Circuit has rec-
ognized and applied this exception; however, its application of the co-
conspirator exception seems to be limited to instances in which the
direct purchaser conspires to fix a price that consumers directly pay.
In Arizona v. Shamrock Foods, the Ninth Circuit outlined and ap-
plied the co-conspirator exception to the indirect-purchaser rule and
held that the Illinois Brick rule did not apply because the defendants
conspired to fix the price that the plaintiffs paid directly.74 Plaintiff
consumers alleged that retail grocery stores conspired with dairy pro-
ducers to fix the retail price of milk that the consumers paid.75 The
court held that Illinois Brick did not apply and that the consumers
were not estopped from proceeding with the litigation.76 The court
reasoned that the consumer's theory did not rely on a pass-on theory
because the consumers confined their claim for damages to the retail-
level price-fixing conspiracy between the grocery store and dairy pro-
68. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 218.
69. Id. at 217-18.
70. Id. at 218.
71. Del. Valley Surgical Supply, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 1123 n.1 (9th Cir.
2008).
72. Id. (citing Arizona v. Shamrock Foods, Co., 729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984)).
73. Shamrock Foods, 729 F.2d at 1211. "Horizontal price fixing is an agreement among com-
petitors" operating at the same level of distribution "to restrain price competition in some way."
Paul Gift, Price Fixing and Minimum Resale Price Restrictions are Two Different Animals, 12
GRAZIADIo Bus. REV. 2 (2009), available at http://gbr.pepperdine.edul2010/08/price-fixing-and-
minimum-resale-price-restrictions-are-two-different-animals/. Vertical price-fixing is a price re-
striction agreement between an "upstream manufacturer on downstream distributors, dealers, or
retailers ... . [ty]pically, a manufacturer specifies a minimum price above which its retailers must
sell its [product]." Id.
74. Shamrock Foods, 729 F.2d at 1211.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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ducers.77 The court further reasoned that the rationale underlying the
Illinois Brick rule was not present: there was no risk of double recov-
ery and no need to apportion the overcharge paid by consumers be-
cause the overcharge was not passed on to the consumers through any
other level in the distribution chain.78 Thus, because the grocery store
vertically conspired to fix the price paid by the consumers, the Illinois
Brick rule did not apply. 79
In Kendall v. Visa USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the
co-conspirator exception applies when the conspirators set the price
paid by the consumer, thereby firmly limiting this exception so as to
apply to direct purchasers only.80 The merchant plaintiffs sued credit
card companies and banks alleging that they conspired to set the
transaction fee charged to merchants for each transaction by setting
the interchange fee.8' The court held that the plaintiffs had to allege a
conspiracy to fix the price paid by the plaintiffs. 82 The court reasoned
that because the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to fix a price that they
indirectly paid through the interchange fee, the co-conspirator excep-
tion did not apply.83 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit has limited the Illi-
nois Brick rule's co-conspirator exception to instances in which there
is a conspiracy to fix prices directly paid by plaintiffs, thereby render-
ing the exception unavailable to indirect purchasers. As a result, the
co-conspirator exception is in effect not an exception at all but, rather,
an altered application of Illinois Brick.
c. Ownership or Control Exception
The third exception to the Illinois Brick rule allows an indirect pur-
chaser to seek damages for alleged antitrust violations when custom-
ers of the direct purchaser own or control the direct purchasers or
when a conspiring seller owns or controls the direct purchaser.84
Under this ownership and control exception, an indirect purchaser
may sue where a direct purchaser is a division or subsidiary of a co-
conspirator.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1214.
79. Shamrock Foods, 729 F.2d at 1211.
80. Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2008).
81. Id. at 1049.
82. Id. at 1045.
83. Id. at 1050.
84. Dicta in Illinois Brick recognized an exception to the indirect purchaser rule "where the
direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
736 n.16 (1977). Courts have extended this exception to situations in which the direct purchaser
is owned or controlled by the violator. See, e.g., Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621
F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1990).
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This exception was outlined in Royal Printing v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp.85 Plaintiff printing company filed an action against ten of the
nation's largest paper manufacturers for price fixing and other anti-
trust violations.86 The paper manufacturers sold their products
through their wholesaling divisions or wholly-owned subsidiaries.87
The court held that, although the printing company was an indirect
purchaser, it could maintain an antitrust action if the direct purchaser
was a division or subsidiary of a co-conspirator.88 In this case, the
paper manufacturers owned and controlled the subsidiaries from
which the printing company bought its product. 89 The court reasoned
that an ownership and control exception should be recognized be-
cause when parental control exists (for example, a co-conspirator con-
trols or owns the direct purchaser), applying the Illinois Brick rule
would "close off every avenue for private enforcement of the antitrust
laws in such cases." 90 Furthermore, the court reasoned that neither of
the rationales underlying Illinois Brick were applicable: there was a
small risk of multiple recovery and liability, and determining the por-
tion of the illegal overcharge did not involve Illinois Brick-style com-
plexities.91 Therefore, the indirect purchaser printing company was
able to sue the direct purchaser paper manufacturer.
d. Freeman Exception: No Realistic Possibility that Direct
Purchaser Will Sue
The Ninth Circuit recognized a fourth exception to the Illinois Brick
rule in Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors: an indirect purchaser
can seek damages for alleged antitrust violations if there is no realistic
possibility that the direct purchaser will sue. 92 For example, in a chain
of distribution in which a parent company controls the direct pur-
chaser, it is highly unlikely that the direct purchaser would sue the
parent company because its litigation decisions are likely subject to
parental control.93 The parent company would forbid the direct pur-
chaser to bring a lawsuit that would reveal the parent's participation
in a price-fixing scheme. Public policy underlying section 4 of the
Clayton Act suggests that the indirect purchaser should have standing
85. Royal Printing Co., 621 F.2d 323.
86. Id. at 324.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 326.
89. Id. at 324.
90. Royal Printing Co., 621 F.2d at 327.
91. Id.
92. Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
93. This rationale was previously articulated in Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 326.
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to sue. Section 4 entitles a person injured by an antitrust violation to
treble damages, which reflects Congress's intent to make the Clayton
Act self-enforcing by encouraging private litigation through a treble
damages incentive. 94 Thus, in instances in which there is no realistic
possibility that the direct purchaser will sue, the indirect purchaser
should have standing to bring an antitrust claim.
This fourth exception reflects the court's willingness to recognize
standing for indirect purchasers who have no other course of redress.
However, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected this exception, reasoning
that standing existed in Freeman based on the control or co-conspira-
tor exceptions, not a possible fourth exception. 95 Although, the Su-
preme Court has not yet recognized the potential fourth exception
under Freeman, an exception under Freeman is still conceivable.
The Illinois Brick rule and its exceptions have drawn consistent crit-
icism. 96 By limiting private treble damage actions to the antitrust vio-
lator's direct purchasers, subsequent purchasers, who often suffer
substantial harm, are left without a remedy. While there are several
reasons supporting the Illinois Brick rule, changes in the antitrust
landscape have undermined the rationales underlying the denial of re-
covery to indirect purchasers in federal court. 97 In response to these
changes, the Antitrust Modernization Commission issued a report in
2007 recommending legislative repeal of Illinois Brick. Additionally,
commentators have offered a myriad of ways to correct the indirect
purchaser rule, calling for the Illinois Brick wall to come down.9 8 De-
spite these calls for reform, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed Illinois
Brick and Congress has failed repeal it, leaving the Illinois Brick rule
a high wall for indirect purchasers to overcome.
94. Fowler, supra note 20, at 689.
95. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 756-57 (9th Cir. 2012).
96. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
267-69 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amc fi-
nal-report.pdf (concluding that the Illinois Brick rule should be repealed and noting that thirty-
five states have passed "Illinois Brick repealers"); Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray,
Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 69, 70-71 (2007).
97. Matthew M. Duffy, Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding Exceptions
to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1709, 1719-29. "An anti-enforcement
trend combined with state 'Illinois Brick-repealer' statutes" undermines the policies of the Illi-
nois Brick indirect purchaser rule. Id. at 1719.
98. See, e.g., Daniel R. Karon, "Your Honor, Tear Down that Illinois Brick Wall!" The Na-
tional Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1351 (2004).
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III. SUBJECT OPINION: IN RE ATM FEE LITIGATION
In In re A TM Fee Litigation, the Ninth Circuit unanimously af-
firmed a grant of summary judgment for defendant banks in an anti-
trust suit involving alleged price-fixing of ATM fees.99 The Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiff cardholders were indirect purchasers
within the meaning of Illinois Brick and could not satisfy any of the
exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule, which deprives indirect purchas-
ers of standing to bring federal antitrust claims.100 Because the plain-
tiff cardholders lacked standing to bring suit under section 4 of the
Clayton Act, the District Court's grant of defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment was affirmed. 01
A. Facts
The defendants in this case were STAR Network102 member banks
that both issued ATM cards and owned ATM machines.103 In 2001,
Defendant Concord, a publicly traded Delaware corporation, ac-
quired STAR.104 As a result of Concord's acquisition of STAR, banks
that were previously members of STAR's network (including the bank
defendants in this case) no longer had control of STAR based on own-
ership and board appointment.105 Prior to Concord's acquisition,
STAR's member banks set interchange fees paid by members. 106 Af-
ter the acquisition, Concord revised an agreement with its members
and established a Network Advisory Board composed of larger mem-
ber banks that advised Concord's board on policy and pricing deci-
sions. 0 7 However, the Board had no authority to determine or veto
interchange fee changes. 108
Customers at most banks receive an ATM card that allows them to
make withdrawals from their accounts electronically. 109 ATM cards
typically permit withdrawals from the bank's ATMs as well as ATMs
owned by other banks." 0 When an ATM cardholder withdraws
99. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2012).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 745 (An "ATM Network [is] ... the entity that connects the ATM owners with
card-issuing banks ... and administers agreements between card-issuing banks and ATM owners
to ensure that customers can withdraw money from network member ATMs.").
103. Id.
104. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 745.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 744.
108. Id. at 746.
109. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 768 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
110. Id.
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money from another ATM, several fees are generated."1' One fee is a
"foreign ATM fee" that the cardholder must pay to the bank that is-
sued her ATM card.112 Another is known as an "interchange fee" that
is paid by the card-issuing bank to the owner of the foreign ATM.113
The card-issuing bank sets the amount of the foreign ATM fee, while
interchange fees are set by entities known as ATM networks, which
are responsible for administering agreements between card-issuing
banks and foreign ATM owners.114
In this case, plaintiffs, a class of ATM cardholders, alleged that sev-
eral banks colluded with STAR to fix the interchange fees paid by the
banks, which the banks then passed on to the plaintiffs. 15
B. Procedural History
On July 2, 2004, plaintiff cardholders filed suit alleging horizontal
price-fixing of ATM interchange fees.116 The cardholders alleged that
the card-issuing banks and STAR Network colluded to set artificially
high interchange fees and passed those fees along to customers. 117
The cardholders claimed that the interchange fees were marked up
and charged to cardholders in the separate foreign ATM fee.118 The
cardholders brought an antitrust suit under section 4 of the Clayton
Act, alleging that Concord and the card-issuing banks engaged in hori-
zontal price fixing in violation of federal antitrust law.119 Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the cardholders lacked standing
to allege an antitrust violation because they were indirect purchasers
and, as such, did not directly pay the interchange fee; rather, the bank
defendants paid the interchange fee and then passed on the cost of the
fee through the foreign ATM fees.120




115. Id. at 744.
116. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 744.
117. Id. When an ATM cardholder withdraws money from another bank's ATM, which is
termed a "foreign" ATM, four fees are generated. Id. "The cardholder must pay two of these
fees-one to the ATM owner for use of the ATM (known as a 'surcharge') and one to the card-
issuing bank (known as a 'foreign ATM fee'). The card-issuing bank also pays two of these
fees-one to the ATM network that routed the transaction (known as a 'switch fee') and one to
the ATM owner ('known as an 'interchange fee')." Id. In this case, the plaintiff cardholders
alleged that defendant banks and ATM network engaged in a horizontal price fixing scheme by
"collud[ing] to fix the [ATM network's] interchange fee, which [was] then passed on to [card-
holders] as part of the foreign ATM fee." Id. at 746.
118. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 746
119. Id.
120. Id. at 750.
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On September 4, 2009, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss for lack of standing.121 The court found that there was no realis-
tic possibility that the bank defendants would sue STAR and that the
plaintiffs were purchasing directly from the price-fixing conspira-
tors. 12 2 Thus, accepting all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and
construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
two of the exceptions to Illinois Brick were applicable.123 Subse-
quently, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the Illinois Brick rule barred the cardholders as indirect purchasers
from recovering treble damages in an antitrust suit.124
On September 17, 2010, the district court granted summary judg-
ment, dismissing the suit on the basis that the cardholders lacked
standing under Illinois Brick's indirect purchaser rule.12 5 The court
found the cardholders to be indirect purchasers because they did not
directly pay the alleged fixed interchange fee.126 The card-issuing
banks paid the interchange fee and passed on the cost to the cardhold-
ers through the foreign ATM fee.127 Furthermore, the court found
that no exception to the Illinois Brick rule was applicable.128 The
plaintiff cardholders appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.129
C. Ninth Circuit's Opinion
On July 12, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff cardholders
lacked standing to seek damages for the alleged antitrust violations. 30
The Ninth Circuit applied the indirect purchaser rule from Illinois
Brick and agreed with the district court's determination that the card-
holders were indirect purchasers and, as such, lacked antitrust stand-
ing.' 3' The cardholders conceded that they never directly paid the
interchanges fees.132 They argued that, nonetheless, the court should
121. Id. at 746.
122. Id.
123. The co-conspirator exception and the fourth exception under Freeman were applicable in
In re ATM Fee Litigation. See supra pp. 9-12.
124. In re A TM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 746.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 750.
128. Id. at 744.
129. In re A TM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 747.
130. Id. at 744.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 749-50.
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consider them direct purchasers because the foreign ATM fee that
they paid was an illegally fixed fee, which included the passed-on in-
terchange fee.133 However, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize the
cardholders as direct purchasers of the fixed interchange fee at is-
sue.134 The Illinois Brick indirect-purchaser rule applied, stripping the
cardholders of antitrust standing.
Furthermore, the court found that none of the three exceptions to
the Illinois Brick rule applied to the cardholders. First, there was no
preexisting cost-plus contract between the cardholders and the card-
issuing banks, and the cardholders did not contend that they had a
preexisting cost-plus contract with any of the defendants. 135 Second,
the co-conspirator exception did not apply because, even though the
cardholder's theory of recovery depended on pass-on damages, the
cardholders did not pay the interchange fee directly but, rather, paid
the fee via the foreign ATM fee.136 The Ninth Circuit held that the
co-conspirator exception is strictly limited to situations where the al-
leged conspiracy directly fixed the price actually paid by the plain-
tiff.137 Here, the cardholders alleged a conspiracy to fix interchange
fees, which the defendant banks paid, not the cardholders. The court
reasoned that it was insufficient that the foreign ATM fees paid by the
cardholders were paid by an alleged co-conspirator.138
Third, the ownership and control exception did not apply because
neither the bank defendants nor STAR were divisions or subsidiaries
of the other.139 The banks collectively owned only about 10% of
STAR's common stock.140 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
there was no evidence that the bank defendants had control of
STAR's board of directors.141 Mere alleged collusion between a di-
rect purchaser (the bank defendants) and the entity setting the price
(STAR), without an ownership or control relationship, was not
enough.142 Therefore, the ownership and control exception could not
help the plaintiffs overcome the Illinois Brick rule.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize the fourth exception
under Freeman. The court rejected the cardholders' argument that
133. Id.
134. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 750.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 752.
137. Id. at 752-53.
138. Id. at 755-56.
139. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 756.
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they should have standing to sue as indirect purchasers because there
was no realistic possibility that the bank defendants would bring an
antitrust suit against STAR.143 The Ninth Circuit declined to extend
the Freeman exception to situations in which the seller does not own
or control the direct purchasers because it would undermine the Illi-
nois Brick rule.144 Therefore, because the cardholders were indirect
purchasers and could not satisfy any of the exceptions to Illinois
Brick, the defendants' grant of summary judgment was affirmed.145
IV. ANALYSIS
In essence, the indirect purchaser rule from Illinois Brick has effec-
tively wiped out indirect purchaser standing under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. By limiting private treble damage actions to the anti-
trust violator's direct purchasers, subsequent purchasers, who often
suffer substantial harm, are left without a remedy. The Supreme
Court must expand standing for indirect purchasers in antitrust litiga-
tion because under the high wall built by Illinois Brick, indirect pur-
chasers will likely always be found to lack standing, thereby
prohibiting private parties from bringing antitrust claims under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act. Consequently, the Act's statutory mandate
entitling a person injured by an antitrust violation to treble damages
has been rendered ineffective and meaningless.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in In re ATM Fee Litigation is prob-
lematic for several reasons, and, as a result, the court erroneously
used Illinois Brick to build a high wall for indirect purchasers to over-
come. First, the court failed to extend critical exceptions to the Illi-
nois Brick rule and refused to recognize an exception that it had
previously stated nine years earlier.146 Specifically, the court failed to
extend the co-conspirator exception to apply to conspiracies that fix
the price indirectly paid by plaintiffs. Furthermore, the court had an
opportunity to expand the cost-plus exception to apply to instances in
which the relationship between the direct and indirect purchasers re-
sembles that of a cost-plus contract. However, the court failed to
elaborate on and expand this exception, leaving it unavailable to indi-
rect purchasers. Additionally, the court refused to recognize a fourth
exception under Freeman that would recognize standing for indirect
purchasers to seek damages for alleged antitrust violations if there is
no realistic possibility that the direct purchaser will sue.
143. Id.
144. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 757.
145. Id. at 758.
146. See generally id. at 741.
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Second, the Ninth Circuit's decision severely narrows the scope of
section 4 standing for indirect purchasers. The court recognizes stand-
ing for the direct purchaser who has suffered little or no injury, and
denies standing to the injured, indirect purchaser. This contradicts an-
titrust law and section 4's mandate that a person injured due to an
antitrust violation is entitled to treble damages.147 Limiting section 4
standing solely to direct purchasers is inconsistent with the public pol-
icy underlying antitrust law in general and section 4 of the Clayton
Act in particular. The Ninth Circuit's holding and opinion in In re
A TM Fee Litigation completely undermines the Clayton Act's expan-
sion of a party's right to bring antitrust suits. By narrowing the scope
of section 4 standing, the Ninth Circuit has effectively invalidated the
underlying purpose of the Clayton Act. As a result of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision, indirect purchasers cannot avoid "run[ning] squarely
into the Illinois Brick wall," which the Ninth Circuit has substantially
fortified. 148
A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Expand and Recognize the Illinois
Brick Exceptions
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly refused to extend the co-conspirator
exception to Illinois Brick so as to apply to conspiracies that fix the
price indirectly paid by plaintiffs. The court correctly determined that
the plaintiff cardholders were indirect purchasers, under Illinois
Brick's indirect purchaser rule because the cardholders explicitly con-
ceded that they never directly paid the interchange fees; rather, they
indirectly paid the interchange fee via the foreign ATM fee.149 Addi-
tionally, the court correctly held that the cost-plus exception did not
apply in this case because the plaintiff cardholders did not contend
that such a contract existed with the defendants. However, the court
refused to broaden the co-conspirator exception to include plaintiffs
who allege a conspiracy to fix a price that they indirectly paid. In
doing so, the Ninth Circuit effectively rendered the co-conspirator ex-
ception illusory.
The co-conspirator exception, as construed by the Ninth Circuit, is
meaningless because it applies to direct purchasers only. As a result,
the co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick is no longer an exception
but, rather, a recapitulation of the indirect purchaser rule set forth in
Illinois Brick and an application of the ordinary rules of joint and sev-
eral liability in antitrust cases. A purchaser that directly pays the price
147. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
148. Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008).
149. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 757.
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illegally fixed by a conspiracy is entitled to sue all members of the
conspiracy, while Illinois Brick bars a purchaser that paid a price af-
fected by the fixed priced .
The Ninth Circuit outlined the co-conspirator exception in Sham-
rock Foods, in which the court held that the co-conspirator exception
applies only when the price that was fixed by the conspirators was the
same end price paid by the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff's recovery
does not depend on a pass-on theory of damages.150 Thus, the co-
conspirator exception applies to purchasers who directly paid the ille-
gally fixed price. The Ninth Circuit's application of the co-conspirator
exception in Shamrock Foods limited the exception to instances in
which there is a conspiracy to fix prices directly paid by plaintiffs.151
The court did not apply the Illinois Brick rule because the consumers
paid the fixed price directly.152 Thus, indirect purchasers would still
lack standing to bring an antitrust claim, thereby rendering the co-
conspirator exception meaningless.
In In re A TM Fee Litigation, the plaintiffs paid the foreign ATM
fee, not the bank interchange fee that the defendants allegedly fixed.
Therefore, the court found that plaintiffs did not qualify for the co-
conspirator exception because the plaintiffs indirectly paid the alleg-
edly fixed price.'53 The foreign ATM fees that the plaintiff cardhold-
ers paid were fixed in the sense that the conspiracy had the purpose
and effect of fixing the foreign ATM fees. Nonetheless, the court re-
jected such a broad definition of price-fixing for standing purposes.154
By refusing to recognize that the co-conspirator exception must al-
low standing for purchasers of fixed downstream prices, the court
transformed the co-conspirator exception so that it only applies to di-
rect purchasers. Thus, the co-conspirator exception to the Illinois
Brick rule is not really an exception at all because it does not apply to
indirect purchasers. The Ninth Circuit should have extended the co-
conspirator exception to include plaintiffs who allege a conspiracy to
fix indirectly paid prices in order to give indirect purchasers standing
to bring an antitrust suit.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize and apply the
fourth exception to the Illinois Brick rule, which the court had previ-
ously established in Freeman. The Freeman exception allows indirect
purchasers to sue for damages when there is no realistic possibility
150. See generally Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 1211-12.
152. Id.
153. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d at 753-54.
154. Id.
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that the direct purchaser will sue.155 In Royal Printing, the Ninth Cir-
cuit articulated the ownership and control exception to Illinois Brick
and allowed indirect purchasers to sue "where the direct purchaser is
a division or subsidiary of a co-conspirator."156 Subsequently, in Free-
man, the Ninth Circuit, citing Royal Printing, enunciated a similar, yet
distinct, exception to Illinois Brick. The court recognized that "indi-
rect purchasers can sue for damages if there is no realistic possibility
that the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust viola-
tion."' 57 Although the court relied in part on the ownership and con-
trol exception, the court explicitly created a new exception in
recognition of the fact that denying standing to indirect purchasers
merely because the defendants sold their services through another en-
tity rather than to consumers directly would open a major loophole
for resale price maintenance and retailer collusion.158
In Freeman, co-conspiring realtor associations conspired to fix
prices paid by the direct purchaser, who then passed on a portion of
that inflated fee to consumers.159 The court recognized standing for
the indirect purchasing consumers because it was unlikely that the di-
rect purchaser, which the realtor associations owned, would sue.'60
The court said that "[t]his is precisely the type of injury [that] antitrust
laws are designed to prevent."161 Similarly, in In re ATM Fee Litiga-
tion, it was extremely unlikely that the bank defendants (the direct
purchaser) would sue STAR Network. Although STAR did not own
the bank defendants, STAR was the ATM network that administered
agreements between the bank defendants and ATM owners to ensure
that customers could withdraw money from network member
ATMs.' 6 2 STAR's role in connecting ATM owners and card-issuing
banks, like the bank defendants, translates into a level of control suffi-
cient to deter the bank defendants from suing since a lawsuit would
likely result in termination of the bank defendant's membership with
STAR network.
In its opinion in In re ATM Fee Litigation, the Ninth Circuit made a
feeble attempt at arguing that it would not recognize an exception to
Illinois Brick when there is "no realistic possibility that direct purchas-
155. See generally Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
156. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980).
157. Freeman, 322 F.3d at 1145- 46.
158. Id. at 1146.
159. Id. at 1145.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1146.
162. In re ATM Fee Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 2012).
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ers will sue."163 The court declined to extend the ownership and con-
trol exception noted in Royal Printing to situations where the seller
does not own or control the direct purchasers because it did not want
to undermine the Illinois Brick rule.'" However, the court failed to
realize that denying indirect purchasers standing, despite no realistic
possibility that that direct purchaser will sue, is inconsistent with and
completely undermines section 4 of the Clayton Act and its mandate
entitling a person injured by an antitrust violation to treble damages.
Although the plaintiffs in Freeman relied on the ownership and con-
trol exception to find standing, doing so did not undermine the ex-
plicit exception outlined by the court in its opinion in Freeman.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit refused to expand the cost-plus exception
to Illinois Brick so as to apply to contracts resembling a cost-plus con-
tract. A cost-plus contract is a "fixed-markup, fixed-quantify contract
that [is] negotiated prior to an illegal price increase."165 The direct
purchaser adds a pre-specified dollar amount to its price for a product
before resale or adds a pre-specified percentage of its cost to the sale
price.166 When a preexisting cost-plus contract "specifies both the di-
rect purchaser's markup and the quantity to be delivered to the indi-
rect purchaser, an indirect purchaser can show that the dealer passed
on [the overcharge under the contract]." 67
Under the cost-plus exception to the Illinois Brick rule, the indirect
purchaser has standing when a preexisting cost-plus contract with the
direct purchaser exists.168 Herbert Hovenkamp argues that, as practi-
cal matter, "few contracts qualify for this exception."169 As
Hovenkamp points out, courts have recognized the cost-plus excep-
tion when a contract between the indirect and direct purchaser speci-
fies a fixed-markup, fixed-quantity, and the illegally-fixed price.170
Although contracts that specify a markup or price are common, con-
tracts that specify both a markup and a quantity are not. Therefore,
while a cost-plus exception to the Illinois Brick rule exists, few con-
tracts qualify for this exception, rendering this first exception
meaningless.171
163. Id. at 757.
164. Id. ("'[tihe possibility of allowing an exception, even in rather meritorious circumstances,
would undermine the rule"') (quoting Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 216
(1990)).
165. Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1720.
166. Id. at 1721.
167. Id. at 1720.
168. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 217-18 (1990).
169. Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1720.
170. Id. at 1720-21.
171. Id.
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In order for the cost-plus exception to the Illinois Brick rule to have
any real meaning for indirect purchasers, courts should broaden the
exception to apply to contracts that resemble a cost-plus contract.
One way to breathe life into this exception would be to extend stand-
ing to indirect purchasers that have the functional equivalent of a cost-
plus contract with the direct purchaser.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize new exceptions or
extend existing exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule in In re A TM Fee
Litigation. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has built a high wall for indi-
rect purchaser suits. Thus, it will likely be impossible for indirect pur-
chasers to bring antitrust suits under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion is Inconsistent with the Clayton Act
The indirect-purchaser rule from Illinois Brick is inconsistent with
antitrust law in general and section 4 of the Clayton Act in particular.
Section 4 is an antitrust damage provision entitling a person injured by
an antitrust violation to three times the damages sustained. As previ-
ously discussed, section 4 is a critical means of recovery for consumers
injured by antitrust violations. However, under Illinois Brick, a direct
purchaser who acts as the middleman in the chain of distribution is
entitled to an antitrust damage action for an illegally fixed fee despite
the fact that the fee is passed on to the direct purchaser's customers,
who lack standing as indirect purchasers. By recognizing antitrust
standing for a direct purchaser despite the fact that it is the indirect
purchaser who is harmed, the Illinois Brick rule is inconsistent with
section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The United States has a strong public policy of protecting competi-
tiveness in markets and has implemented that policy through the en-
forcement of a series of antitrust laws.172 These antitrust laws, which
proscribe cartel and monopolizing behavior, reflect the "economic ob-
jective of enhancing consumer welfare by preventing practices that re-
duce competition."173 In order to effectively enforce antitrust laws,
Congress has authorized private enforcement. Congress first author-
ized private enforcement under section 7 of the Sherman Act. Con-
gress designed the Sherman Act to deter anticompetitive behavior by
subjecting violators to both government prosecution and private
172. The three major antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal
Trade Commission Act. See SHENEFIELD ET AL., supra note 15, at 15-23.
173. Id. at 10-11.
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treble-damage actions. 174 Private enforcement of the Act played two
important functions: deterrence and compensation. By trebling the
damages, Congress intended to both compensate victims and deter an-
titrust violators by encouraging private parties to enforce the laws.
Passage of the Clayton Act signaled the expansion of individual pri-
vate parties' ability to sue for damages.175 Section 4 of the Clayton
Act provides that any person who is injured by an antitrust violation
"shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonably attorney's fee."176 Thus, section 4 man-
dates that private parties may recover treble damages for injuries suf-
fered from antitrust violations.
By creating a private right of action for victims of antitrust viola-
tions, Congress was able to promote several polices. Section 4's treble
damage provision provides ample relief and compensation to those
injured by anticompetitive conduct, which in turn deters future anti-
trust violations. 77 Furthermore, section 4 reflects Congress's intent to
make the Clayton Act self-enforcing by encouraging private litigation
through a treble damages incentive. 78 The treble damages provision
"provides strong encouragement for private attorneys general to en-
force antitrust laws, which in turn deters potential [violators] from vio-
lating antitrust laws."179  Additionally, the enforcement and
deterrence objectives underlying section 4 further the broad substan-
tive goals of antitrust law generally: "to promote competition, eco-
nomic efficiency, and consumer welfare; to prevent concentrations of
economic and social power; and to protect small business from over-
reaching conglomerates."180
The Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion in In re ATM Fee Litigation undermine the policy objec-
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006) (establishing criminal penalties of up to $1 million and ten years
imprisonment for individuals and up to $100 million for corporations); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)
(allowing private victims to seek an amount three times the injury suffered).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
176. Id.
177. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) ("Congress created the treble-
damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust
violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available
to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations."); see also
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 19, at 848-50.
178. Fowler, supra note 20, at 689. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) (permitting treble damage actions encourages enforcement of federal
antitrust laws); see also Mech. Contractors Bid Depository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817, 821
(10th Cir. 1965) (Congress intended private treble damage actions to stimulate private initiative
and diligence in enforcing antitrust laws).
179. Deffense, supra note 21, at 438.
180. Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
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tives of section 4. By limiting private treble damage actions to an
antitrust violator's direct customers, subsequent purchasers, who often
suffer substantial harm from these overcharges, are left with no rem-
edy. This result is inconsistent with section 4's purpose of providing
compensation to those injured by anticompetitive conduct. Addition-
ally, Illinois Brick and In re ATM Fee Litigation are inconsistent with
the self-enforcing objectives underlying the Clayton Act. Congress
sought to encourage the private enforcement of the Clayton Act by
authorizing private actions against antitrust violators by those injured
by such violations. However, by preventing the true victims of anti-
trust violations from bringing private action, the indirect purchaser
rule undermines this objective.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in In re A TM Fee Litigation will have
serious negative implications for indirect purchasers who seek mone-
tary damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act for alleged antitrust
violations. By declining to expand the co-conspirator and the cost-
plus exception to Illinois Brick, and by refusing to recognize a fourth
exception under Freeman, the Ninth Circuit has built a high wall for
indirect purchaser suits. The Ninth Circuit has made it impossible for
an indirect purchaser to avoid "run[ning] squarely into the Illinois
Brick wall." 181 Thus, it will likely be impossible for indirect purchas-
ers to bring antitrust suits under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
181. Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008).
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